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the court reached its verdict because the instrumentality was a bottle?
If so, it is another application of the court's "integrity of the bottle"
doctrine, thus perpetuating a manifestly unjust line of authority.
Wayne T Bunch
COMMERCIAL LAW-IMPLIED WARRANTIES-PASSAGE OF TrTL.- De-
fendant dairy delivered bottles of milk to the home of plaintiff who
received severe injuries when one of the bottles collapsed in his hand.
Plaintiff alleged: (1) that the defendant dairy was negligent m its
manufacturing processes; and (2) that an implied warranty of fitness
or merchantability extended to the bottle, that this warranty was
breached, and that the defendant was liable for special damages.
This comment discusses the holding and reasoning of the court on
the warranty issue; the negligence issue, t.e., res ipsa loquitur, is dis-
cussed supra p. 771.
Evidence at the trial tended to show that the object for sale be-
tween plaintiff and defendant was milk and that the bottle was merely
lent to plaintiff as an incidental service in connection -ith the sale.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held: Affirmed.
Since there is no sale of the bottle no warranty of fitness or merchant-
ability extends to it. Rowe v. Oscar Ewing Distributing Co., 357 S.W
2d 882 (Ky. 1962).
As plaintiff's injuries occurred in 1959, this case is governed by
the Uniform Sales Act,i which was replaced in 1960 by the Uniform
Commercial Code.2 Plaintiff relied on section 15 of the Sales Act
which provides in part:
(1) Where the buyers, expressly or by implication, makes known to
the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the sellers skill or judg-
ment there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reason-
ably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals m goods of that descnption there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.3
It seems that if plaintiff had received injuries from impurities in the
milk itself, either of the above subsections, taken with the special
damages section of the Sales Act,4 would have given plaintiff a basis
iKy. Acts ch. 148 (1928).2 Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 355 (1960) [Hereinafter cited as KRS] [The Uniform
Commercial Code is hereinafter referred to as Code m the text].
SKy. Acts ch. 148, at 487 (1928).4 Ky. Acts ch. 148, at 514 (1928).
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for taking the case to the jury.5 In the principal case, however, the
] (2) of the Sales Act which reads:
A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller transfers the prop-
erty in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.
6
The court felt that in a transaction where the bottles are returnable
for cash, as in the principal case, the above requirements for a sale are
not satisfied. Since the consumer may always recover the sum he gave
to the dealer by returning the bottle, it is illogical to think of the
original transaction as including the sale of the bottle. The recover-
able sum is considered to be a deposit which cannot reasonably be
called consideration. The court was correct in saying there was no
sale of the bottle within the meamng of the Uniform Sales Act
section 1 (2). Significantly, the Uniform Commercial Code definition
of "sale" is substantially the same as that found in the Sales Act.
7
Was the court correct in assuming that the sections on implied
warranties were inapplicable after it had determined that title to the
bottle did not pass? There was undeniably a sale by description of
the milk since the defendant selected the particular goods and de-
livered them to the home of the plaintiff. By the terms of the Sales
Act an implied warranty of merchantability extends to goods sold
by description.8 The term "merchantability" is not defined in the
Sales Act, but is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code.9 One of
the elements of merchantability, as stated in the Code, is that the
goods shall be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require. This definition of merchantability is intended
to clarify rather than change existing law.o At the time the principal
case was decided the Code was available to the court as secondary
authority and the Code definitely raises the possibility that the war-
ranty of merchantability may extend beyond the actual article for sale.
Hadley v. Hillcrest Dary,ii a 1961 Massachusetts case with facts
similar to those m the principal case, was decided under identical
circumstances. The Code had been passed in Massachusetts, but the
case was governed by the Sales Act. Also, the plaintiff received in-
juries from a collapsing milk bottle delivered by the defendant
5 Snead v. Waite, 306 Ky. 587, 208 S.W 2d 749 (1948).
court barred the action through its strict interpretation of section
6Ky. Acts ch. 148, at 481 (1928).
7KRS 355.2-106 (1960) provides that "a sale consists in the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price.
SKy. Acts Ch. 148, at 487 (1928).
9 KRS 355.2-314 (1960).
10 Uniform Commercial Code §2-314, comment 6 (1958); Hawkland, Sales
and Bulk Sales 42 (1958); Void, Law of Sales 437 (2d ed. 1959).11341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E. 2d 293 (1961),
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dairy. The court, in overruling a directed verdict for the defendant,
held that it was immaterial whether title to the bottle passed to the
buyer. The court reasoned: there was a contract for the sale of goods
-milk; it was necessary that the goods be delivered in a container;
therefore there was a contract for the sale of goods in a container;
and, since the container was necessary for the completion of the con-
tract, the warranty of fitness or merchantability extends to the con-
tainer. This reasoning seems to capture the intent of warranty law
that a seller should be responsible for his product.
The result in the principal case could lead to decisions which
would be arbitrary and unfair when related to the circumstances of
the contract for sale. A person buying beer, for example, has a choice
of buying in returnable or non-returnable bottles. Applying the
principal case, an implied warranty of merchantability would extend
to the non-returnable bottles but not to the returnable bottles. The
returnable bottles may explode or collapse with impunity without
subjecting the seller to liability-at least on warranty grounds. Such
a distinction seems totally unrelated to the everyday business of buying
and selling which warranty law is intended to govern. The Hadley
case reached the commercially sound result, t.e., a buyer, when a
product in a container is placed in his hands by a seller, may assume
the whole to be sound without regard to the title of the container.
William H. Fortune
